11/20/1985 - Laserfiche WebLink

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NOV 2 0 1985 Q Boa 62 DGUE therefore, took the position that unless the County's existing sign ordinance specifically says that a building in the shape of a product is a sign, then it is not prohibited. The County ordinance does not say that, and it is not specific enough to put' the public on notice. Commissioner Bird noted that Attorney Vocelle makes one contention and our County Attorney makes another. Commissioner Scurlock did not feel we have indicated that the building per se is a sign, and that is why he drew the analogy earlier that if you took the outside wall of that particular building and painted it with some large mural that advertised cigars or some product, or the wall is developed and designed in such a way that it advertises, that is what is a sign. Commissioner Wodtke asked what it would be considered if you built it like an ice cream cone but put a flat roof on it so that the entire building did not look like an ice cream cone. Director Keating replied that he would consider it a sign based on the criteria that Attorney Vitunac outlined before, i.e., would the building as it was designed constitute advertis- ing of the product. Director Keating then informed the Board that Chief Planner Miller has pointed out that in our current sign definition we specify that a sign can be a structural type of entity; also, in the overall definition of the Zoning Ordinance, a structure is defined as being among other things a sign. Director Keating, therefore, believed that Attorney Vocelle's argument that a sign has to be just the lettering part of anything is a fallacy and is not supported by the definition we have in the Zoning Code. Attorney Vocelle felt that while a structure can be a sign, it would not be an actual building that someone can walk into, but Director Keating pointed out that structures are defined as buildings also. Chairman Lyons asked if anyone present wished to be heard. 38