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****PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE FINDINGS**** <br />In December 2002, the FMPA joined a group of municipal power agencies for the planned construction of a coal <br />powered plant in Taylor County, Florida, for an estimated total cost of $1.6 billion. The FMPA had planned to <br />provide this power to the ARP. The FMPA's anticipated share of the cost of the project was $624 million, which <br />would be funded by a bond issuance. In June 2006, the Board approved issuance of bonds and the issuance of <br />interest rate swaps up to a $700 trillion notional amount (Taylor swaps). The meeting presentation provided by <br />FMPA staff indicated that the swaps would "lock in financing rates for a project that might not need permanent <br />funding until the 2012 to 2015 timeframe" under the assumption that future interest rates would rise. The FMPA's <br />expectation was that the issuance of variable interest rate debt with an accompanying pay -fixed swap would create <br />synthetically fixed interest rate debt that would be economically advantageous to the FMPA. In September 2006, a <br />Need for Power Determination was filed with the Florida Public Service Commission (PSC) for licensing of the <br />Taylor County coal project. <br />In November 2006, the FMPA entered into 14 pay -fixed interest rate swaps (Taylor swaps), with notional amounts <br />totaling $700 million, whereby the FMPA agreed to pay interest on the notional predetermined rate and to receive <br />interest on the notional amount at a variable benchmark rate. In the case of these swaps, the FMPA agreed to pay <br />fixed interest rates ranging from 3.699 to 3.849 percent and receive variable payments of 72 percent of the 30 -day <br />LIBOR (London Interbank Overnight Rate), a variable interest rate benchmark. In February 2007, the PSC <br />postponed the decision on the Taylor County coal project licensing, and in July 2007, the Governor issued an <br />Executive Order prohibiting new coal plant construction. Consequently, no bonds were issued as the coal powered <br />plant was never constructed, and the FMPA entered into swap agreements without associating those swaps with any <br />underlying debt. Insofar as the Taylor swaps were not associated with a specific hedgeable item (bonds), the swaps <br />were not serving to effectively manage interest rate risk. <br />In June 2009, when the Taylor swaps were valued at negative $34 million, the Executive Committee voted to exit <br />from its Taylor Swap positions but only when the exit would not result in a realized loss (i.e., a loss requiring cash <br />outflow from the FMPA). During January through April 2010, five swaps issued for notional amounts totaling $250 <br />million were terminated at a gain of $84 thousand in accordance with the Executive Committee's directive, leaving <br />swaps with a notional amount of $450 million outstanding. In September 2014, when the nine remaining Taylor <br />swaps were valued at negative $99 million, the Executive Committee authorized staff to automatically pay the <br />termination fee to exit the swaps when the net termination costs did not exceed $5 million per swap contract. In the <br />October 2014 Executive Committee meeting, staff presented several options for exiting the Taylor swaps when the <br />value was negative $108 million, but no official action was taken. <br />A review of source documents from 17 comparable JAAs3 indicated that 4 of those JAAs have issued variable rate <br />bonds with accompanying pay -fixed interest rate swaps. While issuing variable rate bonds with corresponding pay - <br />fixed interest rate swaps is a standard industry practice, none of the 17 JAAs reported an interest rate derivative <br />position absent an underlying bond. Entering into an interest rate derivative position absent an accompanying bond <br />issue is more consistent with a bet that prevailing bond interest rates will rise before any accompanying bond may be <br />issued than a hedge against interest rate changes, which represents risk-taking in excess of industry practice. Further, <br />the Executive Committee minutes discussed above indicated that discussion of exiting the Taylor swaps was focused <br />on avoiding the appearance of a significant realized loss rather than focused on prudent risk tolerance and projections <br />of future changes in the fair value of the swaps. <br />Comparability to the F1\1PA was based on reported peak 1\1W load, wholesale electric revenues, the number of member <br />municipalities, total number of retail customers served, and the generation fuel types employed. <br />12 <br />14 <br />