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Storey v. Mayo, 77 P.U.R.3d 411 (1988) 217 So.2d 304 occurring many times in an extensive system -wide operation could be extremely harmful and expensive to the utility, its stockholders and the great mass of its customers. Tampa Electric Co. v. Withlacoochee River Electric Coop., 122 So.2d 471 (F1a.1960). It was a recognition of this basic concept that led us to approve territorial service agreements between two regulated utilities. Peoples Gas System, Inc., v. Mason, 187 So.2d 335 (Fla.1966); City Gas Co., v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., 182 So.2d 429 (Fla 1965). In the last - cited cases we recognized the importance of the regulatory function as a substitute for unrestrained competition in the public utility field. We there noted that often a regulated or measurably controlled monopoly is in the public interest, and that in the area of public utility operations competition alone has long since ceased to be a potent or even a reasonably efficient regulatory factor. [4] [5] [6] An individual has no organic, economic political right to service by a *308 particular utility merely because he deems it advantageous to himself. If he lives within the limits of a city which operates its own system, he can compel service by the city. However, he could not compel service by a privately -owned utility operating just across his city limits line merely because he preferred that service. In the instant situation, these petitioners have not been denied equal protection because they occupy the same status as all users of the municipal power. In the event of excessive rates or inadequate service their appeal under Florida law is to the courts or the municipal council. or [7] [8] The obligation of the respondent electric company is to furnish reasonably sufficient service to applicants therefor `* * * upon terms as required by the commission * * *' Fla.Stat. s 366.03 (1967), F.SA. When the Commission approved the subject agreement, it, in effect, informed the respondent electric company that it would not have to serve the particular area because under the circumstances it would not be reasonable to require it to do so. Fla.Stat. s 366.05, F.SA, supra. There was certainly competent, substantial evidence to support this conclusion and the Commission had the power to act in the premises. The petitioners here are in the posture of customers demanding service of a particular regulated utility. The regulatory agency has heard the matter and with evidentiary support has concluded that under the circumstances it would be unreasonable to require this utility to render the service. This in substance is the ultimate impact of the arrangement which the Commission has approved. [9] Petitioners' attack on the notice of the hearing is without merit. A formal notice in adequate detail was published. In addition the City notified all of its affected customers by a personally delivered letter well in advance of the hearing. [10] The arrangement under review was reached after several years of negotiations between the City and the Company It received the unanimous approval of the City Council. Following a well-publicized hearing it has been approved by a majority of the respondent Commission which is burdened with the duty of measuring its judgment by the dictates of the public convenience and welfare in this type of situation. When we measure the obligations of the respondent electric company by the responsibilities placed upon it under Fla.Stat.Ch. 366 (1967), F.S.A., and especially in view of the extensive regulatory powers of the respondent Commission, we see no reason to disturb the subject order. The petition for certiorari is denied. Itis so ordered. THOMAS, ROBERTS, DREW and ADAMS (Ret.), JJ, concur. CALDWELL, C.J., dissents. ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion. ERVIN, Justice (dissenting). Once again we have a case where the Florida Public Service Comnnisaion has approved a territorial agreement between two utilities over the objections of a large number of consumers of one of the utilities. Sec earlier cases: City Gas Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., Fla., 182 So.2d 429, and Peoples Gas System, Inc., v. Mason, Fla„ 187 So.2d 335. One is an electric utility municipally operated; the other is aprivate electric power company under the regulation of the Public Service Commission. Despite the fact that the Legislature has never given the Public Service Commission the express power to approve such agreements (and certainly not the power to approve agreements where one of the utilities is municipally operated, over which the Commission has no regulatory jurisdiction), nevertheless the objecting customers who have been saved by the private company, some for many years, now have been 'transferred' *309 by the agreement from the status of customers of the private electric power company to the status of new customers of the City. 's;Vlliiv;Next. © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works. 4