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Storey v. Mayo, 77 P.U.R.3d 411 (1988) <br />217 So.2d 304 <br />occurring many times in an extensive system -wide operation <br />could be extremely harmful and expensive to the utility, its <br />stockholders and the great mass of its customers. Tampa <br />Electric Co. v. Withlacoochee River Electric Coop., 122 <br />So.2d 471 (F1a.1960). It was a recognition of this basic <br />concept that led us to approve territorial service agreements <br />between two regulated utilities. Peoples Gas System, Inc., v. <br />Mason, 187 So.2d 335 (Fla.1966); City Gas Co., v. Peoples <br />Gas System, Inc., 182 So.2d 429 (Fla 1965). In the last - <br />cited cases we recognized the importance of the regulatory <br />function as a substitute for unrestrained competition in the <br />public utility field. We there noted that often a regulated or <br />measurably controlled monopoly is in the public interest, and <br />that in the area of public utility operations competition alone <br />has long since ceased to be a potent or even a reasonably <br />efficient regulatory factor. <br />[4] [5] [6] An individual has no organic, economic <br />political right to service by a *308 particular utility merely <br />because he deems it advantageous to himself. If he lives <br />within the limits of a city which operates its own system, he <br />can compel service by the city. However, he could not compel <br />service by a privately -owned utility operating just across his <br />city limits line merely because he preferred that service. In <br />the instant situation, these petitioners have not been denied <br />equal protection because they occupy the same status as all <br />users of the municipal power. In the event of excessive rates <br />or inadequate service their appeal under Florida law is to the <br />courts or the municipal council. <br />or <br />[7] [8] The obligation of the respondent electric company <br />is to furnish reasonably sufficient service to applicants <br />therefor `* * * upon terms as required by the commission * <br />* *' Fla.Stat. s 366.03 (1967), F.SA. When the Commission <br />approved the subject agreement, it, in effect, informed the <br />respondent electric company that it would not have to serve <br />the particular area because under the circumstances it would <br />not be reasonable to require it to do so. Fla.Stat. s 366.05, <br />F.SA, supra. There was certainly competent, substantial <br />evidence to support this conclusion and the Commission had <br />the power to act in the premises. The petitioners here are in <br />the posture of customers demanding service of a particular <br />regulated utility. The regulatory agency has heard the matter <br />and with evidentiary support has concluded that under the <br />circumstances it would be unreasonable to require this utility <br />to render the service. This in substance is the ultimate impact <br />of the arrangement which the Commission has approved. <br />[9] Petitioners' attack on the notice of the hearing is without <br />merit. A formal notice in adequate detail was published. In <br />addition the City notified all of its affected customers by a <br />personally delivered letter well in advance of the hearing. <br />[10] The arrangement under review was reached after <br />several years of negotiations between the City and the <br />Company It received the unanimous approval of the City <br />Council. Following a well-publicized hearing it has been <br />approved by a majority of the respondent Commission which <br />is burdened with the duty of measuring its judgment by the <br />dictates of the public convenience and welfare in this type of <br />situation. When we measure the obligations of the respondent <br />electric company by the responsibilities placed upon it under <br />Fla.Stat.Ch. 366 (1967), F.S.A., and especially in view of the <br />extensive regulatory powers of the respondent Commission, <br />we see no reason to disturb the subject order. <br />The petition for certiorari is denied. <br />Itis so ordered. <br />THOMAS, ROBERTS, DREW and ADAMS (Ret.), JJ, <br />concur. <br />CALDWELL, C.J., dissents. <br />ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion. <br />ERVIN, Justice (dissenting). <br />Once again we have a case where the Florida Public Service <br />Comnnisaion has approved a territorial agreement between <br />two utilities over the objections of a large number of <br />consumers of one of the utilities. Sec earlier cases: City Gas <br />Co. v. Peoples Gas System, Inc., Fla., 182 So.2d 429, and <br />Peoples Gas System, Inc., v. Mason, Fla„ 187 So.2d 335. One <br />is an electric utility municipally operated; the other is aprivate <br />electric power company under the regulation of the Public <br />Service Commission. Despite the fact that the Legislature <br />has never given the Public Service Commission the express <br />power to approve such agreements (and certainly not the <br />power to approve agreements where one of the utilities is <br />municipally operated, over which the Commission has no <br />regulatory jurisdiction), nevertheless the objecting customers <br />who have been saved by the private company, some for many <br />years, now have been 'transferred' *309 by the agreement <br />from the status of customers of the private electric power <br />company to the status of new customers of the City. <br />'s;Vlliiv;Next. © 2014 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Govemment Works. <br />4 <br />