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ORDER NO. PSC-2018-0028-FOF-EI DOCKET NO. 20180001 -El PAGE 4 Finally, FPL argues that filing for SoBRA recovery in the fuel docket is simply an administratively efficient process utilizing an existing docket with a known filing schedule to adjust its base rates for previously approved capital projects. This eliminates finding and scheduling separate hearing dates each year as SoBRA projects come on line and synchronizes each SoBRA rate base increase with the associated reduction in fuel costs resulting from the projects' commercial operation. Based on these facts, FPL concludes that no jurisdictional issue actually exists and that we have the authority to approve SoBRA charges in this docket. Anal There is one point on which we and all parties agree: that we derive our authority to act solely from the Legislature. United Telephone Company of Florida v. Public Service Commission, 496 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1986). In Woodford, FPL sought to recover through the fuel factor the capital, operation and maintenance, and return on investment costs for wells drilled in the Woodford Shale Gas Region in Oklahoma, The Court identified our authority as the ability to "regulate and supervise each public utility with respect to its rates and service and to prescribe a rate structure for all electric utilities." Woodford, 191 So. 3d at 900. An "electric utility" is defined as a municipal or investor-owned utility or a rural electric cooperative that "owns, maintains, or operates an electric generation, transmission, or distribution system within the state." Section 366.02(2), F.S. Based on this definition, the Court found that the exploration, drilling and production of natural gas did "not constitute generating, transmitting, or distributing electricity in Florida as the meaning of those terms are plainly understood" and "falls outside the purview of an electric utility as defined by the Legislature." Woodford, 191 So. 3d at 901. Further, the Court found that the Woodford project was not a physical hedge of fuel costs which had previously been determined by the Court to be within our regulatory authority. Id. Having determined that the Woodford project was neither an electric utility activity contemplated by the Legislature nor a physical hedge, the Court found that we had exceeded our authority in approving the project costs through the fuel clause. Woodford, 191 So. 3d at 902. In FPUC. the Court found that we exceeded our authority by allowing the recovery through the fuel factor of capital and return on capital investment costs associated with the construction of a transmission line connecting FPUC's electric system on Amelia Island with that of FPL. The Court focused on the historical purpose of the fuel clause as a means of "adjusting for volatile costs associated with fuel" finding that a transmission line failed to meet this test. FPUC, 213 So. 3d at 718. The Court also relied heavily upon the terms of FPUC's rate case stipulation and settlement agreement, which specifically stated that FPUC could not seek recovery through the fuel clause of costs that had "traditionally and historically" been recovered through base rates and used "investment in and maintenance of transmission assets" as an example of such an expense. FPUC, 213 So. 3d at 708-10. Since no discussion of these settlement agreement terms was included in our final order, the Court found that we had "failed to perform its duty to explain its reasoning" and reversed our decision. FPUC, 213 So. 3d at 710-11. Both the Woodford and FPUC decisions discuss what types of costs are appropriately recovered through the fuel clause factor: fuel, purchased power and volatile fuel -related costs. The FPUC decision does not address our inherent authority to allow the recovery of the FPL