5/24/1994 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

I L. Did the reviewing official (Planning and Zoning -Commission) — fail to follow the appropriate review procedures? 2. Did the reviewing official (Planning -and Zoning Commission) act in an arbitrary or capricious manner? 3. Did the reviewing official (Planning and Zoning Commission) fail to consider adequately the effects of the proposed development upon surrounding properties, traffic circulation or public health, safety and welfare? 4. Did the reviewing official (Planning and Zoning Commission) fail to evaluate the application with respect to the comprehensive plan and land development regulations of Indian River County? In staff's opinion, the planning staff and the Planning and Zoning Commission did not fail in any of these four areas and made a logical decision in its interpretation of section 913.06(1). 1. There seems to be no contention regarding review procedures. Mr. Barkett spoke with staff and was verbally given staff's interpretation.- In response, Mr. Barkett wrote staff, explaining his disagreement with staff's verbal interpretation. Staff responded to Mr. Barkett in writing with the justification for staff's interpretation. Mr. Barkett then filed a written appeal, which was processed, and considered by -the Planning and Zoning Commission pursuant to LDR section 902.07. Mr. Barkett's appeal of the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision is now being processed pursuant to LDR section 902.07. Therefore, staff and the Planning and Zoning Commission did not fail in regards to review procedures. 2. The appellant contends that staff and the Planning and Zoning Commission erred in their reading of the ordinance. Staff's position, however, is that its reading of the ordinance is logical. The main contention between staff and the appellant is how 913.06(1) applies or does not apply to rights-of-way other than the three types previously described in this report. In staff's opinion, section 913.06(1) as a whole supports staff's reading of 913.06(1)(c). For example, section 913.06(i)(B) requires all newly created lots to have the minimum lot width prescribed by the applicable zoning district regulations. By definition (see attachment #8), minimum lot width is measured in relation to a front yard which, by definition is measured in relation to street right-of-way. As used in section 913.06(1), the only items recognized as constituting "street right-of-way" are the three types of road right-of-way previously described. In fact, 913.06(1)(c)2 specifically excludes private access, ingress/egress or other easements from being considered street right-of-way. Therefore, in staff's opinion, 913.06(1) requires street right-of-way frontage for all newly created lots and recognizes only the three types of road right-of-way previously described. Most of the wording of section 913.06(1)(c) is constructed in a manner that describes the minimum amounts of frontage required. The appellant's reading of section 913.06(1) is illogical since, under the appellant's reading, a stricter standard of review would apply to parcels having frontage on any of the three roadway types than would apply even to land locked parcels, those having no frontage on any type of roadway or easement. Therefore, staff's reading of the ordinance is not arbitrary. On the contrary, staff's reading is logical and has a logical regulatory effect. 79 MAY 24 1994 BOOK 92 PACE &4