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M M M The Key phrase in Excerpt #4 is "legislative discretion." (Emphasis supplied). As noted in the analysis of Excerpt #1, the fact that the Board has no legislative discretion does not mean the Board has no discretion, but rather that it does have judicial discretion. This raises the question of what amount of discretion is properly exercised by the Board in its quasi-judicial capacity. The Delray Beach case was upheld by the supreme court as in line with Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993), therefore Delray Beach means that the degree of discretion described in Synder (specifically at p. 475 of the opinion) applies to site plan reviews. This discretionary language in Synder basically says that where the landowner's proposal is reasonable under local regulations (i.e., consistent with the local development plan), but "the Board action is also consistent with the plan," then no property right of the landowner is infringed by denying the landowner's proposal. The same degree of discretion is applicable here. So long as the Commissioners action in denying the site plan is consistent with any one relevant provision in the LDRs, no property right of the applicant has been taken. All we are asking the Commissioners to do is to review the site plan for the Sea Mist Shoppes for consistency with all provisions of the LDR's and disallow the proposed configuration (size) and site layout sought by the applicant. In Synder the Board had discretion to limit their approval of a rezoning request to within a specified number of different zoning districts, here, the Board has discretion to limit their approval to a smaller (down sized) site plan and accordingly, to deny the proposed site plan because it is not consistent with the relevant provisions of the LDRs (the size of the use is not consistent with the definition of the CL district, the use devalues surrounding property, the size of the use is not compatible with surrounding properties, the second median cut is not authorized and the traffic analysis failed to address certain key factors). 5. "When the public entity ... conducts site plan ... review, it merely applies established rules of law to existing and uncontested facts." (City of Delray Beach) The point of this excerpt is that the Board should apply "established rules of law," as opposed to "unreasonably" denying approval (Excerpt #2) or deciding based merely "upon the whim or caprice of the public body involved" (Excerpt #3). We agree with this requirement and direct you to the LDRs cited above for the "established rules of law" that the Board is to follow. 6. ". . . the authority of a town to deny the land owner the right to develop his property by refusing to approve the plat of such development is, by statute, made to rest upon the specific standards of a statute or implementing ordinances. Thereafter, the approval or disapproval of the plat on the basis of controlling standards becomes an administrative act." (City of Coral Springs) 7. "It is elementary that once a party complies with all legal requirements for platting there is no discretion in governmental authority to refuse approval of the plat." (City of Coral Springs) These Excerpts are taken together because they are subject to the same analysis I raised in Excerpt #3 above. This is not a "plat approval" issue. By bringing in this case it is a source of needless confusion for the Board. Although I disagree with the appropriateness of this case, I find it interesting that you did not include the Court's decision which was to uphold two out of the three disputed requirements placed on the plat. The Coral Springs court opined: The petitioner's position is that all legal requirements were met inasmuch as the city commission's additional requirements were not properly promulgated standards and therefore were not legal. Respondent city points out the existence of certain standards made applicable by virtue of its home rule powers, in . addition to the landscape standard contained in a city ordinance applicable to condition one. See section 166.02, Florida Statutes (1983). 96 kOX 912-1 T-'Atf.8,70 July 12, 1994