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i do i • The fact that the assessment vehicle of a municipal service benefit unit created under section 125.01(1)(q), Florida Statutes, is an alternative mechanism to home rule powers is clear for many reasons: The courts have consistently construed a statute authorizing a particular county action as an alternative to its authority to act under its home rule power. See, e.q., Taylor v. Lee County, 498 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1986). Legislative intent contained in section 197.3631, Florida Statutes, argues against such a restrictive view of county home rule: "Section 197.3232 is additional authority for local governments to impose and collect non -ad valorem assessments supplemental to the home rule powers pursuant to ss. 125.01 and 166.021, and Chapter 170, or any other law." Such a restrictive view of county home rule would lead to an absurd conclusion when comparing the home rule power of counties to impose assessments to the home rule power of municipalities. In City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1992), the Court concluded that municipal home rule included the power to impose special assessments by ordinance even though section 166.021, Florida Statutes, does not include any general enumeration of the power of a municipality to impose assessments. To conclude that section 125.01 does not provide counties the power to impose special assessments within municipal areas without municipal consent ignores the home rule philosophy incorporated in section 125.01(3)(b): "The previsions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectually carry out the purpose of this section and to secure for the counties the broad exercise of home rule powers authorized by the State Constitution." Such a restrictive view of county home rule would lead to an equally absurd conclusion in areas of municipal preemption. Under such a