08/16/2023 VAB - Laserfiche WebLink

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case citing the language from the Ocean Highway & Port Authority v. Page case that "It is not enough that an exempt entity owns the property and that the property is being used for exempt purposes. The exempt entity owner must also be the entity using the property for exempt purposes." In the instant matters, in all three petitions, the Petitioner is the owner of the parcels. Yet, in all three petitions, a preponderance of the evidence shows that the Petitioner is not the "entity using the property for exempt purposes." A preponderance of the evidence shows that the interpretation of Florida Statute 196.192 has a two (2) prong test. A preponderance of the evidence presented by and through the testimony and presentation of the Okaloosa County Property Appraiser is persuasive in the instant denial by articulating that the "All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally exempt from ad valorem taxation" that the Petitioner must have ownership as an exempt entity of the property along with use of that property for exempt purposes. In the instant matters, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Petitioner has met the test of this first prong. However, a preponderance of the evidence shows that with the second prong, with the specific language being, "All property owned by an exempt entity, including educational institutions, and used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be exempted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the nonexempt use" the Petitioner has not met the import of the second prong whereby a preponderance of the evidence shows that the second prong stands for ownership of property owned by an exempt entity and that property is used predominantly for exempt purposes if the use is indeed charitable and not market rent, then shall be exempt from taxation. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the Petitioner in all three petitions, is not the same entities using the parcels at issue which is contrary to the second prong of Florida Statute 196.192. Testimony from William Slattery from the Property Appraiser's Office was also persuasive in these recommendations for denials: Testified that the use of all three parcels is not use by the Petitioner. Equally persuasive in the recommendation for the denials for all three petitions are the documentary evidence of the leases on the three parcels whereby a preponderance of the evidence show that the leases are leases between two different entities. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the entities are not the same in those leases. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the Petitioner by and through the Petitioner's own testimony admits that the leases are not between the same entities and that the Petitioner leases the parcels for rent. While the Petitioner's counsel's testimony that the "use is a singular use that all churches hold in common which are the teachings of Jesus Christ and giving to the poor" along with the testimony that "the church is unified as a whole" is honorable, it cannot overcome the preponderance of the evidence showing that the entities engaged in the lease agreements are separate entities which is contrary to Florida Statute 196.192 and the caselaw language of the Genesis Ministries, Inc. v. Brown case citing the language from the Ocean Highway & Port Authority v. Page which is "It is not enough that an exempt entity owns the property and that the property is being used for exempt purposes. The exempt entity owner must also be the entity using the property for exempt purposes." -33-