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F, BOOK 99 rm-4025 Taking account of the religious sensibilities of its citizens is u governmental virtue, but it is not a First Amendment right. On the other hand, a law that bencfits similarly situated groups, either public or private, but purposefully excludes religious organizations from such a benefit is to prima facie violation.of the Free Exercise Clause as well as of the Establishment Clause. Protecting schools and churches from the presence, disruption and commotion associated with liquor outlets is a valid secular objective for both schools and churches. The -United States Supreme Court said in the ease of Larkin v. Or's Lam" -,459 U.S. 116, 120 (1982), that "a zone of protection around churches and schools is essential to protect diverse centers of spiritual, educational, and cultural enrichment." The Supreme C.,ourt struck down the Massachusetts law in Larkin only bedause the ban on liquor establishments was not absolute, but allowed churches to either "veto" or approve such establishntenLs on a case by case basis. The court slid not address the subject of whether an absolute ban which was not subject to veto or approval by churches would have been upheld, however, the Court did note: Plainly schcmis and churches have a valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor. Zoning laws have long been employed to this end, and there can be little doubt shout the power of a state to regulate the environment in the vicinity of sehcmis, churches, hospitals, and the like by exercise of reasonable; zoning laws. kL at 121. The Larkin Court mentioned that it had upheld reasonable zoning ordinances protecting such institutions from "so-called `adult' theaters [by recognizing) the legitimate governmental interest in protecting the environment around certain institutions." The Court also noted that noise: laws are also appropriate for such institutions. Id. The right of zoning laws to control the environment around institutions such as schools and churches is clear. The issue involved in changing established coning restrictions for churches while upholding them for schools is a problem involving discriminatory and hostile treatment of religious institutions. Such a change would clearly discriminate against churches which have the same "valid interest in being insulated from certain kinds of commercial establishments, including those dispensing liquor." IU -rhe issue of discriminatory motive is involved in the situation before the Indian River County Board. One court held in Brown v. Borough of Maha!'fev, 35 F.3d 846. 849-50 (3d Cir. 1994), that when the government's discrimination is purposeful, no substantial burden on religion need he shown by the religious claimant. The court refused to apply a substantial burden requirement on the religious claimant because such "would make petty harassment of religious institutions ... immune from the protection of the First Amendment." It is clear that the actions of the Board in this instance would he motivated by a desire to lower zoning protection standards for churches in order to allow a particular commercial establishment to serve liquor near a church while continuing to protect schools from such a negative environmental presence. The United States Supreme Court held in 13osenbereer v Llniv, of Virginia,, 115 S.Ct. 2.510, 2519 (1995), than government may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. The Court said, "[W]e must in each case inquire first into the purpose and object of the governmental action in question ...: ` The motive of the Board in this instance would not pass constitutional muster. DECEMBER 3, 1996 49