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11/20/2018_SpecialCall
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Last modified
1/25/2021 12:40:06 PM
Creation date
12/21/2018 2:52:09 PM
Metadata
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Meetings
Meeting Type
Special Hearing
Document Type
Agenda Packet
Meeting Date
11/20/2018
Meeting Body
Board of County Commissioners
Subject
Brightline; All Aboard Florida; Virgin Trains USA
Settlement agreement
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E.1.1 Evaluating the Risk <br />A commercially available software tool (PHAST Risk v6.7) was used to model the consequences <br />of potential releases resulting in pool fires, flash fires, pressurized jet fires, and explosions, and <br />to calculate the resulting Individual Risk (IR) and Societal Risk (SR) for the mainline and <br />yard/intermodal facilities. Typically, stakeholders (e.g., government agencies, investors, <br />communities) set a threshold risk level that is deemed acceptable. This is called quantitative risk <br />criteria and may vary from region to region and depends upon the type of facility or <br />transportation activity. Currently, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal <br />Railroad Administration (FRA) has not codified quantitative risk criteria for LNG hazardous <br />materials transportation scenarios. Additionally, QRA analyses are not common regulatory <br />requirements in the U.S. and no broadly -accepted risk criteria are employed by domestic <br />communities or industries. <br />In this report, the calculated risk was benchmarked against a similar hazardous commodity— <br />liquefied petroleum gas (ie., propane or LPG). The quantitative risk criteria for evaluating the IR <br />and SR used in this report were developed from those presented for stationary LNG plants in <br />NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas <br />(LNG), 2016 edition. The stationary LNG plant risk criteria are not directly applicable to rail <br />movement of LNG, but these criteria are used as a reference point for evaluating the risk in this <br />report. The risk criteria as applied in this report are summarized in the following table. <br />Summary of IR and SR quantitative risk criteria developed from NFPA 59A (2016) and <br />used in this report. <br />IR Criteria (yr -1) SR Criteria (evaluated per mile for Mainline) <br />Zone 1: IR > 10-' Unacceptable Above: F = 10-4, N = 10 Slope = -1 <br />Zone 2: 10 b <- IR < 10-' ALARP: Region between curves <br />Zone 3: 3 X 10-' <- IR < 10-b Broadly Acceptable Below: F = 10-b, N = 10 Slope = -1 <br />E.2 Findings <br />The QRA generated several findings regarding shipping LNG ISOs on the FECR routes. The <br />analysis required development of an accident model to calculate the release scenarios, which <br />was then used to calculate the risk for various LNG ISO movement options along the routes. The <br />risk was calculated for the rail yards and intermodal facilities by treating them as fixed facilities <br />while the mainline risk was evaluated on a transportation route basis. Since transportation <br />quantitative risk criteria are not typically applied in the U.S., the risk was benchmarked against a <br />similar hazardous commodity—liquefied petroleum gas (ie., propane or LPG) and similar risk <br />criteria proposed for stationary LNG plants in the U.S. Finally, the Individual Risk for the <br />intermodal facilities and mainline transportation routes was mapped to compare against <br />potentially sensitive targets along the routes. <br />1308194.001 - 5691 xvi <br />
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